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Decision-making competence (DMC) reflects individual differences in rational responding
across several classic behavioral decision-making tasks. Although it has been
associated with real-world risk behavior, less is known about the degree to which
DMC contributes to specific components of risk attitudes. Utilizing a psychological risk-
return framework, we examined the associations between risk attitudes and DMC.
Italian community residents (n = 804) completed an online DMC measure, using a
subset of the original Adult-DMC battery. Participants also completed a self-reported
risk attitude measure for three components of risk attitudes (risk-taking, risk perceptions,
and expected benefits) across six risk domains. Overall, greater performance on the
DMC component scales were inversely, albeit modestly, associated with risk-taking
tendencies. Structural equation modeling results revealed that DMC was associated
with lower perceived expected benefits for all domains. In contrast, its association
with perceived risks was more domain-specific. These analyses also revealed stronger
indirect effects for the DMC → expected benefits → risk-taking path than the DMC
→ perceived risk → risk-taking path, especially for behaviors that may be considered
more maladaptive in nature. These results suggest that DMC performance differentially
impacts specific components of risk attitudes, and may be more strongly related to the
evaluation of expected value of a specific behavior.
Keywords: decision-making competence, risk-taking, DOSPERT, domain-specific risk, individual differences,
expected value, risk perception, risk-return model
Introduction
Although choices that are based on sound decision-making principles may not always lead to
the desired outcome, appropriately applying these rules can substantially increase the likelihood
that positive outcomes will outnumber negative ones (Hastie and Dawes, 2010). Research has sug-
gested that individual diﬀerences in the tendency to respond rationally to decisions are associated
with numerous health and social outcomes (Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al.,
2007; Weller et al., 2015). Some researchers have referred to this construct as decision-making
competence (DMC), which has been assessed by providing within-subjects versions of classical
decision-making tasks, such as framing and over/under-conﬁdence eﬀects. Although past studies
have suggested a link between DMC and real-world risk taking, little is known about the degree to
which these tendencies are diﬀerentially associated with the perceptions of riskiness associated with
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 540
Weller et al. DMC and domain-specific risk
an activity, compared to the perceived expected beneﬁts for
engaging in it. According to a psychological risk-return frame-
work, these two dissociable, evaluative components have been
shown to predict the likelihood that one will engage in a partic-
ular activity (Weber and Milliman, 1997; Weber et al., 2002). In
the current study, we address this research question. Given the
apparent domain-speciﬁcity of risk-taking behavior (e.g., Weber
et al., 2002; Hanoch et al., 2006), we examined the degree to
which individual diﬀerences in DMC are associated with risk tak-
ing, perceived risk, and perceived expected beneﬁts across six
domains. In contrast to prior studies that have reported associ-
ations between DMC and risk taking, the current study inves-
tigated how DMC relates to speciﬁc risk evaluations, which are
believed to inﬂuence one’s risk-taking intentions, within the psy-
chological risk-return model across a variety of domains. Guided
by past research and theory, we propose that DMC may more
strongly relate to the perceived expected beneﬁts (i.e., involving
tradeoﬀs between positive and negative consequences) of a par-
ticular activity than an activity’s perceived riskiness (i.e., involving
perceptions of uncertainty).
Accumulating research suggests the existence of systematic
individual diﬀerences in decision behavior and rational thought,
a competence that may not be well-measured by traditional mea-
sures of general mental ability (e.g., Stanovich, 2009; Toplak et al.,
2011). The tendency to respond rationally is believed to improve
accuracy of choices, as the decision-maker more thoroughly
deﬁnes the sample space of all possible events, seeks out and
comprehends relevant information (see Hastie and Dawes, 2010).
Subsequently, decision quality also hinges on eﬀectively valu-
ing and comparing options and ﬁltering out irrelevant “noise”
that is not central to the decision problem, such as incidental
emotion or a particular decision frame (e.g., gain/loss). These
tendencies have been conceptualized as a stable, trait-like con-
struct, labeled “DMC.” In contrast to self-report measures that
assess decision-making styles (e.g., Miller and Byrnes, 2001),
DMC scores are based on objective performance with respect
to either normative accuracy or the consistency of responses on
several classic decision-making tasks. For instance, responding
consistently to decision problems that involve the framing of
otherwise equivalent objective information (e.g., lives saved/lost)
would reﬂect consistency, whereas the ability to follow a deci-
sion rule to select the appropriate option given a multi-attribute
matrix indicates accuracy of a response (Parker and Fischhoﬀ,
2005). Supporting its construct validity, stable individual dif-
ferences using diﬀerent language versions of the DMC mea-
sures, have been observed, modiﬁed versions to accommodate
a wide age range of participants (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;
Del Missier et al., 2012; Mäntylä et al., 2012; Weller et al.,
2012).
If DMC reﬂects the tendency to approach decisions from a
perspective that stresses quality of the decision process rather
than solely focusing on immediate outcomes, one might expect
that greater DMC also will be associated with lower incidence
of behaviors that may bear adverse long-term ﬁnancial, social,
or health consequences. Parker and Fischhoﬀ (2005) found that
lower DMC scores predicted higher incidence of delinquency,
substance abuse, and risky sexual behaviors (e.g., number of
sexual partners) in a sample of 18–19 years old males. With the
revised adult version of the DMC measure (A-DMC), Bruine
de Bruin et al. (2007) reported that lower DMC was associ-
ated with experiencing a greater number of negative decision
outcomes (e.g., divorce). From a clinical perspective, Mäntylä
et al. (2012) found that adults reporting features of Attention
Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder, a disorder related to increased
risk-taking behaviors such as substance use and sexual promis-
cuity (e.g., Barkley, 1998; Mannuzza and Klein, 2000), demon-
strated poorer scores on the Applying Decision Rules scale of
the A-DMC measure. Similar results also were observed for chil-
dren. Weller et al. (2012) reported that greater DMC, using a
child-friendly version of a subset of the original DMC measures,
predicted a lower likelihood that a child was called to the princi-
pal’s oﬃce, and more likely that they reported following through
on a challenging goal that was set for oneself. In a follow-up study,
Weller et al. (2015) found that higher DMC scores at age 10–11
predicted fewer reported emotional, conduct, and peer problems
two years later. Although these diﬃculties do not indicate greater
risk taking directly, poor peer relations and conduct problems are
often precursors to the initiation of health-risking behaviors such
as substance use during adolescence (Clark et al., 2005; Tapert
et al., 2005).
Although these results illuminate the associations beetween
DMC and risk behavior, one must be mindful that risk behav-
ior is a domain-speciﬁc, rathen than unidimensional construct
(see Bromiley and Curley, 1992 for an early review). Weber
et al. (2002) revitalized interest in the psychometric study of
individual diﬀerences in domain-speciﬁc risk taking. To meet
this end, they developed the Domain Speciﬁc Risk Taking scale
(DOSPERT; see also, Blais and Weber, 2006). The DOSPERT
assesses diﬀerent component of risk attitudes (i.e., risk taking,
risk perceptions, and perceived expected beneﬁts) across six
broad domains: Social (e.g., asking an employer for a raise),
Recreational (e.g., skydiving), Investment (e.g., investing in a
speculative stock), Gambling (e.g., betting a portion of income
on a sporting event), Health/Safety (e.g., drinking too much alco-
hol at a party), and Ethical (e.g., cheating on a tax return) risks.
Research has reinforced the external validity of the DOSPERT
and the domain-speciﬁc approach to risk attitude. For instance,
Hanoch et al. (2006) found that individuals who participated in
extreme sports were more likely to accept risks associated with
recreational risks than non-enthusiasts, but did not diﬀer in their
risk attitudes in other domains. Likewise, Markiewicz and Weber
(2013) found that individuals reporting more favorable gambling
risk attitudes were also more likely to engage in excessive stock
trading. Similarly, Zimmerman et al. (2014) found that individual
diﬀerences in ethical risk-taking scores predicted actual dishonest
behavior in the laboratory (see also Gummerum et al., 2014, who
examined this issue with currently- and previously incarcerated
individuals). Finally, Rolison et al. (2014) found that age-related
diﬀerences in risk attitudes demonstrated evidence of domain-
speciﬁcity across the lifespan. Collectively, these ﬁndings suggest
distinct patterns of risky choice behavior and speciﬁc correlates
of each risk domain.
The DOSPERT self-report measure is theoretically derived
from a psychological risk-return model, which was based on
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earlier ﬁnancial models of risk-taking that state that risk-taking
attitude is viewed a function of risk (i.e., variance) and return
(i.e., expected value; Markowitz, 1959). Psychological risk-return
models suggest that the propensity to engage in a risky activity
can be conceptualized in terms of both the perceived riskiness
involved with the activity and the expected beneﬁts from engag-
ing in an activity (Weber and Johnson, 2008). Additionally,
although risks and beneﬁts tend to be positively correlated in
the world (or uncorrelated), they are inversely correlated in peo-
ple’s minds (Slovic et al., 2004). Within this conceptualization,
domain-speciﬁc diﬀerences in risk behavior emerge in how indi-
viduals evaluate and weight these two components (Weber et al.,
2002). Research suggests that increases in the perceived risk-
iness of an activity will be associated with a lower likelihood
that an individual will engage in the activity (i.e., less risk tak-
ing), whereas greater perceived beneﬁts should result in greater
risk taking (Finucane et al., 2000; Weber et al., 2002). Thus, risk
behavior will vary across domains if there are diﬀerences in the
magnitude of perceived risks and/or expected beneﬁts (Weber
et al., 2002).
With these points in mind, we predicted that DMC scores
would be more strongly related to diﬀerences in the perceived
expected beneﬁts of the activity, compared to its perceived
risks. When confronted with potential risky activities, individu-
als demonstrating greater DMC may be more likely to seek out,
attend to, and evaluate a more complete set of information when
making choices, subsequently leading to a more thorough evalua-
tion of the tradeoﬀs between positive and negative consequences.
Subsequently, these individuals may also more heavily weight
the expected value of engaging in the activity, relative to the
perceived riskiness. Preliminary evidence supports this hypothe-
sis. Performance on complex decision tasks have suggested that
expected value is related to executive function and inhibitory
control, similar to patterns observed with DMC (e.g., Parker
and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Henninger et al., 2010; Weller et al., 2012;
Donati et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2014). Directly related to the cur-
rent inquiry, Parker and Weller (accepted) observed that higher
DMC scores were associated with a greater tendency to make
choices based on expected value on a hypothetical behavioral
risky decision-making task. Additionally, studies investigating
the association between personality and decision-making have
demonstrated that traits related to cognitive ﬂexibility and delib-
eration, such as Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness,
respectively, were more consistently associated with diﬀerences
in expected beneﬁts rather than the perceived risks of the activ-
ities (Weller and Tikir, 2011). In contrast, traits related to the
experience of negative emotional states (e.g., Neuroticism) has
been linked to heightened perceptions of risks, but not necessarily
diﬀerences in perceived expected beneﬁts (Butler and Matthews,
1987; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Chauvin et al., 2007; Weller and
Tikir, 2011).
In the current study, we recruited an Italian community
sample of participants, who were asked to complete Italian-
language versions of both the A-DMC and the DOSPERT. We
chose to include four component indices from the A-DMC:
Resistance to Framing, Recognizing Social Norms, Applying
Decision Rules, and Consistency in Risk Perception. These
represented a sampling of two A-DMC indices that assessed
rational responding via accuracy, and two indices that assessed
consistency of responding. We did not include the Sunk Costs
index because the relationship between Sunk Costs and the other
A-DMC components are empirically unclear, with some stud-
ies suggesting a positive association with the other components
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), a negative relationship (Weller
et al., 2012), inconsistent correlations (Del Missier et al., 2012), or
no relationship at all (Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005). We excluded
the A-DMC Over/Underconﬁdence measure in order to reduce
participant burden for this online study.
First, because we only used a subset of A-DMC indices, we
conducted a conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) to determine
whether a one-factor solution that resembled other DMC com-
posite measures reasonably ﬁt the observed data. Next, to test
howDMCwas diﬀerentially associated with risk perceptions, per-
ceived expected beneﬁts, and risk behavior (which we hereafter
refer to as “risk taking”), we used a structural equation model-
ing (SEM) approach. This approach allowed for the examination
of mediation eﬀects; speciﬁcally, the degree to which risk per-
ceptions and perceived beneﬁts mediated the association between
DMC and risk taking. Based on this model, we made four speciﬁc
predictions:
H1: For all domains, risk perceptions will be inversely associ-
ated with risk taking, and perceived expected beneﬁts will
be positively associated with risk taking. Expected beneﬁts
and perceived risks will be inversely correlated.
H2: Greater performance on the DMC component measures
will be associated with lower risk taking, especially for eth-
ical, health/safety, and gambling risks. As an exploratory
question, we tentatively predicted that DMCwould be pos-
itively associated with social risk taking. Because of the
scale’s limited scope content-wise, we made no explicit
predictions regarding investment risk-taking.
H3: Across domains, greater DMC will be more strongly asso-
ciated with expected beneﬁts than perceived risks.
H4: The observed data from the four DMC indicators would ﬁt
reasonably well to a one-factor CFA solution.
H5: We predicted that expected beneﬁts, and not perceived
risks, would mediate the association between DMC and
risk taking across all domains.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A third-party survey research ﬁrm sent 7044 invitations to an
opt-in panel of Italian community residents to participate in
this study. As a result of their participation, respondents col-
lected points to get cash and other prizes. Of these, 921 subjects
completed the entire survey. In the ﬁnal sample, 50 participants
were excluded who took less than 10 min to complete the entire
survey (Median = 31.78 min). Additionally, 67 subjects were
removed because they demonstrated no variance in scores across
DOSPERT items, indicating careless responding, leaving a ﬁnal
N = 804.
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Themedian age for the ﬁnal sample was 35 years (58% female).
For the participants who completed the study, 7.2% of partici-
pants did not possess a high school diploma, 52.2% had a high
school diploma or equivalent, 21.4% received a bachelor’s degree,
and 19.1% received an advanced college degree. This study was
approved by the Ethical Review Committee at the University of
Verona.
Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in the survey via email,
informing them that the survey was available. In the email, par-
ticipants were provided with a hyperlink that directed them to the
questionnaires. As part of a larger study, participants were asked
to complete a battery of questionnaires, including the DOSPERT
and A-DMC component measures. Additionally, participants
completed a broad-based, dimensional personality measure and
several hypothetical decision tasks that were unrelated to the cur-
rent inquiry. Therefore, it will not be discussed further in this
paper.
Measures
Adult Decision Making Competence (A-DMC)
Individual diﬀerences in DMC were assessed by using the Italian
version of the A-DMC, developed by Del Missier et al. (2012).
The A-DMC components used were (see Table 1 for descriptive
statistics).
Resistance to framing
This measure assessed the degree to which individual responses
to decision problems were inﬂuenced by the framing of a
decision problem, either in terms of risky choice framing
(e.g., lives saved/lives lost; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)
or attribute framing (e.g., 95% success vs. 5% failure of a
health prevention program; Linville et al., 1993). This mea-
sure consisted of 14 framing problems (seven of each type).
Respondents scored their level of preference for a choice (i.e.,
either the risky or riskless option in the risky choice-framing
task, or on an attribute, such as “eﬀectiveness of program,”
for the attribute framing items) on a 6-point Likert scale.
Resistance to framing was measured by the mean absolute
diﬀerence in response between the diﬀerent frames of the
same task. Scores were then reﬂected such that greater posi-
tive values related to greater resistance to framing. Cronbach’s
α = 0.67.
Recognizing social norms
This measure assessed the understanding of social norms (16
items), and was adopted from Loeber (1989) and Jacobs et al.
(1995). Participants ﬁrst endorsed whether or not it is “sometimes
OK” to engage in several behaviors that may be deemed unde-
sirable (e.g., to steal under certain circumstances). Later in the
assessment, respondents were asked to rate “out of 100 people
your age,” how many would endorse each of the same behaviors.
For each participant, performance was measured by the corre-
lation between the actual endorsement rate of the behavior in
the sample (out of 100%) and the estimated percentage of peers’
endorsements across the 16 behaviors. Because this component
was calculated in this manner, reliability cannot be accurately
estimated; however, Cronbach’s α= 0.76 for individual’s personal
endorsement rates.
Applying decision rules
Respondents were asked to answer ten items that assessed their
ability to follow a set of decision rules in order to make an
accurate selection from ﬁve options in a multi-attribute matrix.
Across the items, participants are asked to choose a DVD system
that matches a hypothetical buyer’s search criteria (e.g., “Paolo
wants to buy the DVD with the most attribute ratings that were
above average.”). Each consumer chooses from a diﬀerent set of
ﬁve equally priced DVD players with varying ratings of picture
quality, sound quality, programming options, and brand reli-
ability (1 = very low; 5 = very high). Each problem had one
correct response. Performance was represented as the percentage
of correct responses, Cronbach’s α= 0.65.
Consistency in risk perception
This measure assessed the degree to which the participants fol-
lowed probability rules. Respondents answered 10 items concern-
ing the possibility of an event occurring to them within the next
month. Later in the assessment, participants evaluated the pos-
sibility that the event would occur to them in the next two years.
Correct responses were indicated by the probability of an event of
occurring in the next month being no more than the probability
of the same event occurring in the next two years. Performance
was indicated by the number of probability-consistent responses
made. Cronbach’s α = 0.57.
Domain-Specific Risk Taking
Participants completed an Italian version of the 40-item
DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002)1. The measure was adopted
using a back-translation procedure with an independent bilingual
1During this process, we changed the content of two questions. First, the item in
the Original DOSPERT, “Betting a day’s income at the horse races” was changed to
“betting a day’s income at a slot machine” because horse racing is uncommon in
Italy. Second, we changed the original question, “eating high-cholesterol foods” to
“regularly eating foods that are fried and unhealthy foods.”
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for the A-DMC.
M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis 1 2 3 4
(1) Recognizing social norms 0.28 (0.30) −0.47 −0.43 –
(2) Decision rules 0.38 (0.20) 0.40 −0.40 0.36 –
(3) Consistency in risk perception 0.65 (0.21) −0.49 −0.23 0.27 0.25 –
(4) Resistance to framinga 1.89 (0.50) −0.60 0.33 0.09∗ 0.13 0.06 –
N = 804. Correlations in bold are significant at p < 0.01.∗ p < 0.05. aResistance to framing scores were reflected so that higher scores reflect greater performance.
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translator. The DOSPERTmeasures individual diﬀerences in risk
attitudes across six domains: Health/Safety (e.g., “Not wearing
a helmet when riding a motorcycle”), Ethical (e.g., “Cheating
on an exam”), Recreational (e.g., “Taking a skydiving class”),
Social (e.g., “Approaching your boss to ask for a raise”), Gambling
(e.g., “Playing in a high-money poker game”), and Investment
(e.g., “Investing 5% of your annual income in a conserva-
tive stock”) risks. Participants assessed the likelihood that they
would engage in a particular behavior (i.e., Risk taking), in
addition to the activity’s perceived risks (Risk Perceptions) and
the perceived expected beneﬁts for engaging in the behavior
(Expected Beneﬁts). Following Weber et al. (2002), partici-
pants were asked to “please indicate your likelihood of engag-
ing in each activity or behavior” on a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = Extremely unlikely; 5 = Extremely likely). Risk percep-
tions were assessed by asking participants to indicate “how risky
they perceived each of these activities (“For each of the fol-
lowing statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each
situation”; 1 = Not at all risky; 5 = Extremely risky). Finally,
we asked participants to rate the degree to which they would
expect beneﬁts from each activity (“For each of the follow-
ing statements, please indicate the beneﬁts you would obtain
from each situation”; 1 = No beneﬁts at all; 5 = Great ben-
eﬁts). We standardized the order of presentation for these
assessments such that we ﬁrst administered the Risk Taking
scale, then the Risk Perception scale, and ﬁnally the Expected
Beneﬁts scale. DMC items as well as other scales unrelated
to the current study were interspersed between the DOSPERT
scales. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the DOSPERT
scale.
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for the DOSPERT scale.
Scale α M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis
Risk taking
Health/safety 0.76 19.19 (6.09) 0.28 −0.44
Ethical 0.86 17.78 (6.87) 0.52 −0.40
Recreational 0.84 19.11 (7.12) 0.29 −0.76
Social 0.68 25.89 (5.04) −0.46 0.59
Gambling 0.81 8.51 (3.94) 0.54 −0.67
Investment 0.83 10.42 (3.94) 0.02 −0.74
Expected benefits
Health/safety 0.84 29.54 (5.63) −0.62 0.99
Ethical 0.86 28.27 (5.81) −0.32 0.59
Recreational 0.82 28.35 (5.46) −0.31 0.55
Social 0.82 21.39 (5.57) 0.21 −0.02
Gambling 0.72 14.79 (3.10) −0.34 0.28
Investment 0.74 12.69 (3.11) 0.31 0.30
Risk perceptions
Health/safety 0.88 16.69 (6.83) 0.63 −0.37
Ethical 0.92 16.23 (7.29) 0.59 −0.75
Recreational 0.88 20.06 (7.45) 0.04 −0.86
Social 0.78 20.84 (5.76) 0.01 −0.01
Gambling 0.87 8.08 (3.83) 0.60 −0.67
Investment 0.88 9.21 (3.90) 0.10 −1.01
Data-Analytic Strategy
First, we examined the zero-order correlations between the com-
ponent DMC indices and domain-speciﬁc risk attitudes. For
the primary analyses, SEM analyses were conducted to deter-
mine the degree to which expected beneﬁts and perceived
risks mediated the eﬀects of DMC on domain speciﬁc risk
taking. Then, CFA and SEM analyses were conducted with
MPlus 7.2 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2012) software pack-
age. Parameters were estimated using the full-information max-
imum likelihood method, which uses all available information
from all observations. Path parameters were freely estimated
in this model. The variance of the latent variable was ﬁxed
at 1.0. We conducted 2000 bootstrap resamples in order to
obtain p-values and reliable conﬁdence intervals for the indi-
rect eﬀects (Shrout and Bolger, 2002; Edwards and Lambert,
2007).
The measurement model for these analyses speciﬁed DMC
as a one dimensional factor with four indicators. Because we
used only a subset of DMC indices, we ﬁrst conducted a CFA
in the absence of other structural relations to test the degree
to which our one-factor model ﬁt the data. Then, a structural
model was developed in line with the theoretical risk-return
framework (see Figure 1). Speciﬁcally, this model speciﬁed that
perceived risks and expected beneﬁts fully mediated the rela-
tionship between DMC and risk taking. For model simplicity,
perceived risks, expected beneﬁts, and risk taking were treated
as observed variables. We conducted six parallel SEM analy-
ses, one for each risk domain. Model ﬁt was evaluated using
several established ﬁt indices, including χ2 goodness of ﬁt,
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standard-
ized root mean square residual (SRMR), and comparative ﬁt
index (CFI; see Loehlin, 2004 for detailed explanation of ﬁt
indices).
To test for mediation, we compared three models: (a) the
X (DMC) → Y (risk taking), (b) X → Y and X → M → Y
partial mediation model, and (c) X → M → Y full-mediation
model. The full mediation model was tested last determine if
the removal of the direct path from DMC to risk taking pro-
vided a better model ﬁt than the partial mediation model.
We did not explicitly test via structural equation models, the
X → M and M → Y models because the correlational anal-
yses indicate signiﬁcant relations, and henceforth suggest that
the preliminary conditions for mediation were met (Baron and
Kenny, 1986). Chi-square diﬀerence tests were conducted to
determine whether the partial or full mediation model best ﬁt the
data.
FIGURE 1 | Proposed mediation model.
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Results
Associations between Risk Taking, Risk
Perceptions, and Expected Benefits
As shown in Table 3, risk perceptions associated with a particular
domain were inversely, and most strongly, related to risk tak-
ing in that domain. Similarly, expected beneﬁts were positively,
and most strongly, associated with risk taking in the correspond-
ing domain. Additionally, with the exception of the Social risk
domain, risk perceptions were inversely associated with expected
beneﬁts. Both risk perceptions and expected beneﬁts were robust
predictors of risk taking. With the exception of the social domain,
these results support Hypothesis 1.
Associations between Risk Taking and
A-DMC Components
Table 4 shows the correlations between DOSPERT risk taking,
risk perception, expected beneﬁt scales and the A-DMC compo-
nents. Inspection of this table reveals several important trends.
Overall, we found support for Hypothesis 2. We found that
performance on the A-DMC components were signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with self-reported risk taking for all domains, except Social
risk taking. Speciﬁcally, lower DMC scores were related to more
positive attitudes toward risk taking, especially for risky behav-
iors that are typically associated with lower inhibitory control,
self-regulation, and greater sensation seeking. However, these
direct associations were modest in eﬀect size. Although these
correlations were largely robust, we note two major exceptions.
First, we found that DMC component scores were most weakly
associated with risk taking in the investment domain. Scores on
the individual DMC component measures were not associated
with Investment risk taking, although these indices were inversely
associated with both lower perceived risks and lower expected
beneﬁts, consistent in magnitude with the other DMC com-
ponent measures. Second, the Resistance to Framing measure
was not signiﬁcantly associated with risk attitude in a system-
atic way. This ﬁnding is particularly notable, because half of the
items in this scale were considered “risky choice” framing prob-
lems, in the tradition of the “Asian Disease” problem (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981). We conducted a follow-up correlational
analysis between the domain-speciﬁc risk measures and both
Resistance to Risky Choice Framing and Resistance to Attribute
Framing, in order to rule out whether one form of framing atten-
uated these correlations. For both attribute and risky framing,
we found no evidence that the aggregation of the two types of
framing problems attenuated the overall Resistance to Framing
correlations. The correlations between these framing subscales
and risk attitudes were largely uniform, for risk-taking (Mean
r = 0.03 and 0.03, for risky choice and attribute framing, respec-
tively), risk-perceptions (Mean r = 0.05 and 0.04), and expected
beneﬁts (Mean r = −0.02 and 0.07).
Also, we found that the DMC components were more strongly
associated with expected beneﬁts, compared to perceived risks.
To conﬁrm these observations and provide further support
TABLE 3 | Correlations between risk perceptions, expected benefits, and risk taking.
DOSPERT risk taking
Scale Health/safety Ethical Recreational Social Gambling Investment
Risk perceptions
Health/safety −0.41 −0.37 −0.24 −0.03 −0.30 −0.15
Ethical −0.28 −0.41 −0.21 −0.12 −0.25 −0.16
Recreational −0.28 −0.24 −0.43 −0.07 −0.21 −0.13
Social 0.02 0.08 0.06 −0.29 0.10 0.01
Gambling −0.27 −0.30 −0.20 −0.06 −0.45 −0.20
Investment −0.09 −0.11 −0.08 −0.16 −0.12 −0.38
Expected benefits
Health/safety 0.57 0.53 0.43 0.11 0.48 0.28
Ethical 0.47 0.63 0.38 0.08 0.49 0.31
Recreational 0.39 0.38 0.70 0.24 0.35 0.28
Social 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.28
Gambling 0.46 0.48 0.39 0.09 0.66 0.31
Investment 0.28 0.35 0.31 0.13 0.36 0.58
DOSPERT Expected Benefits
Risk perceptions
Health/safety −0.40 −0.37 −0.22 −0.16 −0.31 −0.23
Ethical −0.28 −0.36 −0.25 −0.19 −0.23 −0.19
Recreational −0.28 −0.26 −0.42 −0.15 −0.23 −0.20
Social 0.31 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.30 0.20
Gambling −0.31 −0.32 −0.23 −0.19 −0.41 −0.25
Investment −0.01 −0.07 −0.10 −0.06 −0.05 −0.32
N = 804. Within-domain correlations are in bold. Correlations greater than or equal to | 0.10| are significant at p < 0.01.
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for Hypothesis 3, we followed Steiger’s (1980) z-score proce-
dure2 to test for diﬀerences between dependent correlations,
comparing the correlation between DMC and risk perceptions
and the correlation between DMC and expected beneﬁts for
each domain. We followed this procedure for three of the
four component measures (Recognizing Social Norms, Applying
Decision Rules, and Consistency in Risk Perception). For the
Health/Safety, Ethical, and Gambling domains, we found that
all of the nine comparisons were signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
For the Investment and Recreational domains, we found no
diﬀerences between perceived risks and expected beneﬁts. In
contrast, the Social domain showed the opposite pattern (i.e.,
rdmc−risk perception > r dmc−expected beneﬁts). Therefore, we found
mixed support for Hypothesis 3; the hypothesis was supported
for the more “maladaptive” risks, but not for the more socially
accepted risks. That is, individuals who scored lower on the DMC
measure were more not only more likely to state that they would
engage in risk behaviors like cheating on an exam or drinking too
much at a party, but also their perceptions and expected beneﬁts
diﬀered. Speciﬁcally, individuals with lower DMC scores typically
saw less danger associated with these behaviors, as well as seeing
more beneﬁts associated with engaging in them.
Measurement Model: Confirmatory Factor
Analysis- DMC
Using CFA, we tested whether a one-factor DMC solution includ-
ing the four DMC indicators ﬁt our data. We expected that a
unidimensional DMC latent construct would reasonably ﬁt our
data (Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;
Weller et al., 2013). Table 4 shows the path estimates and stan-
dard errors for the indicator variables. Supporting Hypothesis
4, this model yielded good ﬁt to the data, suggesting that these
indicators can be conceptualized as a latent DMC construct, χ2
(2) = 1.67, p = 0.45, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00,
SRMR = 0.01. These ﬁt indices were close to perfect due to the
relatively low degrees of freedom. The standardized factor load-
ings all were signiﬁcant at p < 0.01. Reliability for the latent
variable was calculated using McDonald’s omega, ω= 0.56.
Structural Models Examining the
Associations between DMC and Risk
Attitude
Next, we examined the degree to which risk perceptions and
expected beneﬁts mediated the associations between DMC and
domain-speciﬁc risk taking. We conducted parallel SEM analyses
for each risk domain. Figure 2 shows the standardized param-
eter estimates for the ﬁnal model of each analysis (see Table 5
for ﬁt indices). Table 6 reports the speciﬁc standardized total and
indirect eﬀects for each domain.
Direct Paths from Perceived Risks and Expected
Benefits to Risk Taking
Consistent with past research, we found that risk perceptions
and perceived beneﬁts signiﬁcantly contributed to the variance
2This approach derives a Z-score to be tested between the two correlations of
interest (rjk–rjh), while accounting for the correlation, rkh.
TABLE 4 | Correlations between A-DMC component scales and DOSPERT
scales.
Recognizing
social norms
Decision
rules
Consistency
in RP
Resistance
to framing
Risk taking
Health/safety −0.14 −0.11 −0.18 −0.05
Ethical −0.18 −0.09 −0.17 0.00
Recreational −0.17 −0.10 −0.18 −0.03
Social 0.13 0.16 0.04 −0.08
Gambling −0.21 −0.11 −0.19 −0.01
Investment −0.09 0.01 −0.06 −0.03
Risk perceptions
Health/safety 0.17 0.11 0.13 −0.06
Ethical 0.04 −0.02 0.01 −0.10
Recreational 0.14 0.07 0.11 −0.02
Social −0.34 −0.31 −0.23 −0.07
Gambling 0.14 0.09 0.09 −0.02
Investment −0.15 −0.17 −0.09 −0.07
Expected benefits
Health/safety −0.31 −0.25 −0.26 −0.03
Ethical −0.31 −0.21 −0.25 −0.03
Recreational −0.11 −0.06 −0.14 −0.01
Social −0.12 −0.07 −0.12 −0.04
Gambling −0.31 −0.26 −0.24 −0.03
Investment −0.20 −0.14 −0.17 −0.02
N = 804. Correlations in bold are significant at p < 0.01.
for all domains. Greater perceived risks in a particular domain
were related to a lower likelihood of risk taking for those behav-
iors. Conversely, expected beneﬁts were positively associated with
risk taking. For all domains, the magnitude of the path between
expected beneﬁts and risk taking was stronger than the direct
path from perceived risks to risk taking. Further, our results
revealed inverse correlations between risk perceptions and per-
ceived beneﬁts, with the exception of the social domain which
showed no correlation between these variables.
DMC and Risk Taking
Health/safety domain
As shown in Figure 2 (Panel A), the ﬁnal model revealed that
DMC had a signiﬁcant inverse path to expected beneﬁts and a
signiﬁcant positive path to perceived risks. Although both the
indirect eﬀects from DMC to risk taking, via expected beneﬁts
and risk perceptions were signiﬁcant, these eﬀects were stronger
for the DMC→ expected beneﬁts → risk taking path. The coeﬃ-
cient of the direct path from DMC to risk taking decreased from
β= −0.25 in the X → Y regression model to β= 0.05 in the par-
tial mediation model. The chi-square diﬀerence test conﬁrmed
that the full mediation model better ﬁt our data, χ2diﬀ = 0.97,
p = 0.34. Thirty-seven percent of the variance was explained in
the ﬁnal model.
Ethical risk domain
We found a similar pattern of results for the ethical risk domain.
However, unlike the health/safety domain, the indirect eﬀects
were signiﬁcant solely through the DMC → expected beneﬁts →
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FIGURE 2 | Final structural equation models for each risk domain. (A–F) Reflects the risk domain. ∗∗p < 0.01.
risk taking path. In fact, when accounting for expected beneﬁts,
DMC was not signiﬁcantly associated with risk perceptions in the
ethical domain (Figure 2, Panel B). The coeﬃcient of the direct
path from DMC to risk taking decreased from β = −0.26 in the
X → Y regression model to β = 0.00 in the X → Y, X → M →
Y model. Again, the chi-square diﬀerence test conﬁrmed that the
model with only indirect paths from DMC to risk taking better
ﬁt our data, χ2diﬀ = 0.02, p = 0.99. Forty-four percent of the
variance was explained in the ﬁnal model.
Recreational risk domain
In the ﬁnal model for recreational risk taking, 52% of the
variance was explained. DMC had a signiﬁcant inverse path
TABLE 5 | Standardized factor loadings for confirmatory factor analysis –
DMC one factor solution.
95% confidence interval
Variable name Parameter
estimate
SE Lower Upper
Applying decision rules 0.59 0.05 0.5 0.69
Consistency in risk perception 0.43 0.04 0.34 0.51
Resistance to framing 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.27
Recognizing social norms 0.61 0.05 0.51 0.71
All parameter estimates significant at p < 0.001.
to expected beneﬁts and a signiﬁcant, but smaller in magni-
tude, positive path to perceived risks. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient
of the direct path from DMC to risk taking decreased from
β = −0.26 in the regression model without mediators to a
reduced, but still signiﬁcant, β = −0.13 in the partial media-
tion model (see Figure 2, Panel C). The chi-square diﬀerence
test revealed that a partial mediation model provided a better
TABLE 6 | Standardized effects (total and indirect), and confidence
intervals of the indirect effects.
Indirect effects on risk taking
Risk domain Total effects
on risk taking
Expected
benefits (95% CI)
Risk perception
(95% CI)
Health/safety −0.29∗∗ −0.23∗∗
(−0.28, −0.18)
−0.05∗∗
(−0.08, −0.03)
Ethical −0.26∗∗ −0.26∗∗
(−0.32, −0.19)
0.00
(−0.02, 0.02)
Recreational −0.26∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(−0.17, −0.05)
−0.03∗∗
(−0.05, −0.01)
Social 0.20∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(−0.12, −0.04)
0.13∗∗
(0.08, 0.19)
Gambling −0.30∗∗ −0.28∗∗
(−0.34, −0.22)
−0.04∗∗
(−0.06, −0.02)
Investment −0.11∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(–0.21, –0.11)
0.05∗∗
(0.02, 0.08)
∗∗p < 0.01.
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ﬁt for the data than the full mediation model, χ2diﬀ = 13.97,
p< 0.001.
Social risk domain
In the ﬁnal path model for the social risk domain (Figure 2, Panel
D), 24% of the variance was explained. Diﬀerent than the other
risk domains, DMChad signiﬁcant inverse paths to both expected
beneﬁts and perceived risks, with the latter path being stronger.
Moreover, the indirect eﬀects were signiﬁcant for both indirect
paths. The chi-square diﬀerence test revealed that the partially
mediated model provided a better ﬁt for the data χ2diﬀ = 7.35,
p < 0.001. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of the direct path from
DMC to risk taking decreased from β = 0.20 in the regression
model without mediators to β = 0.15, p < 0.01, in the partial
mediation model.
Financial risk taking: a divergence between gambling and
financial risks
With the DOSPERT measure, ﬁnancial risk taking can be
split into two subdomains: Gambling and Investment risks.
Because gambling is typically seen as more of a problem risk
behavior (e.g., Slutske, 2007), we predicted that the relation-
ship between DMC and gambling risks would more closely
resemble the results observed for the ethical and health/safety
risk domains. In contrast, Investment risk scale items focus
on more socially desirable risks that involve the potential
for ﬁnancial growth. Hence, in light of the observed results
for Social Risk Taking, we tentatively speculated that higher
DMC may be associated with greater Investment risk taking,
and its relations with perceived risks and expected beneﬁts
may more closely resemble the pattern observed with social
risks.
Consistent with our predictions, we found that Gambling risks
were associated with the risk-return model in the samemanner as
ethical and health-safety risks (Figure 2, Panel E). As predicted,
both indirect paths were signiﬁcant, but the indirect eﬀects for the
DMC→ expected beneﬁts→ risk-taking path were stronger than
the indirect eﬀects via risk perceptions. The DMC → risk-taking
path reduced from β = −0.33 in the X → Y regression model to
β = 0.02 in the partial mediation model. The chi-square diﬀer-
ence test conﬁrmed that the full mediation model better ﬁt our
data, χ2diﬀ = 0.18, p = 0.67. Forty-eight percent of the variance
was explained with the full mediation model.
As shown in Figure 2 (Panel F), we observed that DMC had
signiﬁcant direct paths to the mediator variables. Similar to social
risk taking, greater DMC was related to lower perceived expected
beneﬁts and lower perceived risks associated with investment
risk taking. Though we found signiﬁcant indirect eﬀects for
investment risk taking, we did not ﬁnd evidence to support any
mediation in this domain; the parameter estimate for DMC in the
X→Y regression model was β= −0.09, p= 0.075, suggesting no
initial direct path, and hence, no mediation. Moreover, compared
to the full mediation model, the X → Y, X → M → Y model did
not improve model ﬁt, χ2diﬀ = 0.11, p = 0.74, which suggests
DMC only impacts investment risk taking indirectly. Thirty eight
percent of the variance in risk taking was explained with the ﬁnal
model.
Discussion
Although several studies previously have reported associations
between DMC and risk taking, the current study is the ﬁrst to
investigate how the construct relates to speciﬁc risk evaluations
within the psychological risk-return model that are believed to
inﬂuence one’s risk behavior. Our results extend the literature in
three main ways. First, consistent with our predictions and past
research, we found that greater DMC was inversely associated
with risk taking; this was especially the case for activities that are
more likely to be deemed maladaptive in nature, such as ethical,
health/safety, and gambling risks. Second, within the context of
the risk-return model, our results suggest that DMC was more
strongly related to expected beneﬁts than risk perceptions, but
only for risk behaviors that can be considered more problematic
from a health, interpersonal, or ﬁnancial perspective. We believe
that this distinction may relate to a greater tendency to evalu-
ate and appropriately weight positive and negative consequences,
rather than amore aﬀective evaluation about the perceived uncer-
tainty of an activity. Third, the evaluation of potential expected
beneﬁts more strongly mediated the relationship between DMC
and risk taking than did risk perceptions, with the exception of
the social risk domain. These ﬁndings suggest that individual dif-
ferences in DMC may not directly impact risk taking, but instead
are associated with a preceding valuation process of potential
hazards/activities.
Similar to past studies investigating this construct, the DMC
components that we assessed reasonably converged to a one-
factor model. This result reinforces that a latent variable signi-
fying a broader cognitive competence may characterize perfor-
mance on these tasks. Because we did not include the entire
A-DMC measure, we cannot speak to the robustness of its fac-
tor structure extending beyond these four indicators. As a result,
we must temper our conclusions, not only as they apply to the
unidimensionality of the construct, but as they apply to the
excluded component tasks. However, the pattern of correlations
that we observed are consistent with other DMC studies. More
speciﬁcally, the observed inter-item correlation matrix strongly
resembles that reported in the only other known use of the
Italian version of the A-DMC (Del Missier et al., 2012). We espe-
cially note potential associations between Over/Underconﬁdence
with risk attitudes that were observed previously (Parker and
Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), and traits related to
real-world risk behaviors (e.g., narcissism; Campbell et al., 2004).
Somewhat surprising, our results revealed that Resistance to
Framing was not associated with risk-taking behaviors. Notably,
Parker and Fischhoﬀ’s (2005) original study found signiﬁcant cor-
relations between their framing measure and risk behaviors. We
oﬀer two potential explanations for these inconsistencies. First,
these two studies diﬀered in the operationalization of decision
outcomes which may have impacted this divergence. Speciﬁcally,
Parker and Fischhoﬀ (2005) assessed reports of actual risky
behavior that is typically considered to be health-risking (i.e.,
substance use and sexual behavior in isolation). In contrast, the
current study assessed risk behavior intentions. Though we can-
not rule this point out, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) also did
not observe an association between resistance to framing and
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self-reported negative decision outcomes, similar to the current
study. Because the Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) study measured
Resistance to Framing in the same way as the current method, we
suggest that another potential reason for these discrepancies may
be due to the breadth of the Resistance to Framing measures used
in the Y-DMC and A-DMC. The Y-DMC Resistance to Framing
scale adopts a broader perspective of framing, including an inter-
temporal choice item, for instance, in addition to traditional risky
choice and attribute framing items. Given that delay discount-
ing has been linked with impulsiveness, this may have inﬂuenced
the results (e.g., Lawyer et al., 2010). In contrast, the A-DMC
measure takes a more conceptually narrow approach to framing,
focusing solely on attribute and risky choice framing. Although
further examination of this issue falls outside the scope of the cur-
rent study, we feel that this DMC component may beneﬁt from
further development in order to better establish content valid-
ity. Potential inclusions may involve the problems included in
the original Y-DMC (e.g., Fischhoﬀ, 1993; Shaﬁr, 1993), but also
other forms of framing problems such as ones that are believed
to access more verbatim-level processing as proposed by Fuzzy
Trace Theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995; Kühberger and Tanner,
2010).
With respect to the issue of domain-speciﬁc risk taking, the
current study not only yielded an Italian-language version of
the 40-item DOSPERT scale, but also it further reinforced the
construct validity of the DOSPERT measure. With the excep-
tion of the Social risk domain, we found that expected beneﬁts
positively predicted risk taking within each domain, whereas per-
ceived riskiness of an activity inversely predicted risk behaviors.
Additionally, we found that perceived risks and expected bene-
ﬁts were inversely correlated with one another in all domains.
Further, we found that individual DMC scores were diﬀerentially
associated with perceived risks and expected beneﬁts across the
six risk domains, supporting the assertion that risk behaviors are
domain-speciﬁc.
Moreover, our observed results resonate with the theoretical
perspective of risk-return models. We found that DMCwas more
strongly associated with perceived expected beneﬁts, which is the-
oretically tied to the evaluation of expected value, than perceived
risks, which is associated with the evaluation of the variance
of choice options (e.g., Markowitz, 1959; Weber and Milliman,
1997). These two types of evaluations may arise from two dis-
tinct processes: a more aﬀective pathway focusing on evaluations
of risk/uncertainty, and amore deliberative pathway that involves
tradeoﬀ assessments between potential positive and negative con-
sequences. In fact, the directions that are used for the elicitation
of perceived risk and expected beneﬁts are likely to facilitate dif-
ferent processing modes. Speciﬁcally, perceived riskiness of an
activity by asking the participant to rate “your gut level assessment
of how risky each situation or behavior is,” potentially facilitating
more experiential processing (Weber et al., 2002). In contrast,
expected beneﬁts are elicited by asking participants to indicate
“the beneﬁts you would obtain from engaging in the following
activities.” In this light, basing decisions on the expected ben-
eﬁts, or expected value, can be viewed as a more deliberative
process due to the necessity for accurately evaluating and inte-
grating net outcome magnitude and the probability that each
potential consequence will be realized. Because both DMC and
sensitivity to expected value are both purported to recruit delib-
erative thinking and cognitive control processes (Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007; Henninger et al., 2010; Del Missier et al., 2012; Weller
et al., 2012, 2015; Donati et al., 2014), individuals demonstrating
greater DMCmay bemore likely tomore thoroughly evaluate and
appropriately weight both potential positive and negative con-
sequences. In contrast, risk perceptions are commonly believed
to be strongly aﬀect-laden and experiential in nature (Slovic
et al., 2004). Although it extends outside of the scope of this
study, we speculate that the evaluation of variance (i.e., risk) may
involve less taxing computational processes, and thus, may be
less related to DMC, and more broadly, executive control func-
tion. We are conducting follow-up studies to further test these
hypotheses.
With respect to the measurement of DMC, we call upon
researchers to progressively move toward standardized assess-
ments across studies in order to increase interpretability of
results across studies. We acknowledge that rational respond-
ing on other types of decision-making paradigms, which are not
included in the DMC battery, may also constitute “competent
decision-making.” Although other tasks may indeed serve as an
indicator for DMC, our ﬁndings reinforce the notion that the
current battery represents a sample of behaviors/performance
that may reﬂects a higher-order latent variable indicating indi-
vidual diﬀerences in normative responding. We encourage such
future psychometric inquiry. Consideration of other related skills
can improve understanding of the construct’s phenotypic struc-
ture by better determining its dimensionality, and widening its
nomological network. Of course, one potential challenge to the
expansion and further testing of this construct, especially with
respect to developing DMC batteries in other cultures, is to
maintain the integrity of the component measures while simul-
taneously being sensitive to the fact that individuals from other
cultures may have a diﬀerent knowledge base (e.g., in the case
of overconﬁdence), or prevailing social norms (e.g., as in the
case of recognizing social norms). A second challenge relates
to more practical concerns. Addition of measures to the DMC
battery will lengthen assessment times, which may not be feasi-
ble in some circumstances. In this regard, item-response theory
approaches to streamline measures ultimately may prove to be
useful, both in terms of time-saving and improving the reliability
of the measures.
At a broad level, these results may also have implications for
interventions that are designed to improve decision-making. If
decision-making skills can be taught (Baron and Brown, 1991;
Dhami et al., 2012), one direct implication may be that risk behav-
iors may attenuated, either by decision-making education. For
instance, Jacobson et al. (2012) found improvements in DMC
scores by integrating a decision-education curriculum into a
U.S. History high school history course. Additionally, develop-
ing computerized decision aids may assist in several regards.
First, it may help the individual better understand his/her own
preferences and long-term goals. Second, these systems may
eﬀectively guide the individuals through the decision problem to
arrive at a choice that are consistent with those aims, preserving
cognitive eﬀort in the decision maker when facing risky choices
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(see Diehl et al., 2003). Aside from direct interventions, inter-
ventions designed to improve self-regulatory capacities may also
reduce risk behaviors, as well as decision-making tendencies. As
an example, Weller et al. (in press) found that maltreated ado-
lescent girls who were randomly assigned to an early foster-care
intervention (at age 11) designed to improve emotion regulation,
self-control, and goal-setting (Chamberlain et al., 2006) made
more normative decisions (i.e., on the basis of the expected value
of a gamble) on a risky decision-making task (administered at age
16 years) thanmaltreated girls who received foster care services as
usual. Although maximal eﬀects would likely occur using a com-
bination of these techniques, studies such as these oﬀer a promise
that decision-making skills are indeed malleable.
Conclusion
This study extends past research by demonstrating the rela-
tionship between risk taking and DMC, and potential pathways
by which DMC may inﬂuence risk evaluations. Our ﬁndings
reinforce the domain-speciﬁcity of risk, and how individual
diﬀerences in DMC may relate speciﬁcally to risky activities
across diﬀerent domain. Moreover, this study demonstrated that
DMC is preferentially associated with perceived expected ben-
eﬁts, compared to risk perceptions. This ﬁnding supports the
assertion that DMC impacts risk assessment through a more
reasoned, deliberative pathway, as opposed to a more aﬀective
one. We hope that these results may ultimately lead to improved
risk communication eﬀorts and bolster interventions designed
to abate risky behaviors.
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